Introduction
The aim of this paper is to carry on a welfare analysis of the impact of price cap regulation by investigating the regulator's implicit preferences -expressed in terms of welfare weights -over different classes of consumer groups. The paper wishes to explore this possibility by adapting the framework suggested by Ross (1984) to detect the implicit regulator's welfare weights within a "generic" Ramsey formula 1 , to infer welfare weights when the regulatory environment is characterised by price cap regulation. The intent is to supply a methodology which could be fruitfully applied to analyse price cap reforms such that undertaken in UK to regulate the tariffs of telecommunication services for residential customers.
It is clear that different types of consumers experience varying degrees of advantages from the regulators' choices over prices. On the other hand, by these choices, a full informed regulator with the right to fix the prices of the goods produced in a regulated monopoly would implicitly assign different values to the welfare of different types of 1 The approach proposed by Ross (1984) is equivalent to the Ahmad and Stern (1984) inverse optimum problem developed to derive the implicit welfare weights underlying a commodity tax structure. consumers. That is, under no uncertainty, if the prices are directly chosen by the regulator, they exactly reveal the regulator's preferences over consumers, and the strategy of inverting a "generic" Ramsey formula with potentially diverse welfare weights may be usefully followed.
It is well known, however, that asymmetric information characterises almost every regulatory situation and to leave some pricing discretion to the firm is often both unavoidable and desirable. Nevertheless, to consider prices chosen by the regulated firm does not rule out the possibility of investigating the regulator's welfare weights. A Laspeyres-type price cap, for instance, allows pricing discretion within borders that force the regulated firm to exploit its superior information set by making choices which lead to Ramsey prices in the long run (Vogelsang and Finsinger, 1979; Bradley and Price, 1988; Brennan, 1989; and Vogelsang, 1989 In some sense this problem reminds that dealt with by Ross (1984) . period from 1990/91 to 1995/96, we can see from the first row of table 1 that the price cap allowed an annual average reduction of the prices in telecommunication equal to 6.6%. In the other rows of table 1 we can see how this reduction in prices has spread among different classes of BT's consumers. If we analyse the bills charged to residential customers and those charged to business customers, we observe that the annual average reduction of prices in telecommunication was equal to 4.2% for the former and 9.3% for the latter. Moreover, within residential customers we can see that some groups have got less benefit than others.
Indeed, the top 20% of high spending residential customers received annual price cuts equal to 5.7% on average, while the average annual cut was less than half (2.7%) for the rest of BT's residential customers.
The main reason for that has been the different competitive pressures faced by BT in different markets. Indeed, competition has been particularly severe in the most profitable business sector and, according to Oftel (1997) , nowadays the access to other providers is a so realistic alternative in this segment that the telecommunication services supplied to business customers have been totally removed from the capped basket since 1997.
On the other hand, competition is not yet sufficiently mature to guarantee an authentic option to the majority of residential customers who have therefore continued to be protected by price cap regulation. At the same time, Oftel has being aware of the necessity of implementing some correction to guarantee higher defence to those consumer groups who received less benefits in the past. To understand the reason that pushed Oftel to deal with this issue by restricting the former price cap to the only revenues earned by British Telecom from low and medium spending residential customers, it can be useful to analyse the expenditure in telecommunications among different residential consumer groups.
A synthesis of this analysis is reported in table 2 that shows the average quarterly spend per BT's residential customer in 1994/95. The whole of residential customers splits its "Uncovering regulator's implicit social welfare weights under price cap regulation" by Edilio Valentini valentini Data creazione 13/09/2002 1:09 PM 1346 total expense in telecommunication assigning 65% of the bill to calls and the residual 35% to rental. These shares change if we rank customers by spend. The customers in the first 80% (low and moderate users) approximately split equally their bills in calls and rental (51% and 49% respectively) while, for the remaining 20% of high users, rental measures only 17% of total expenditure (versus the 83% of calls).
These figures allow to shed further light on the reason of the little advantage accruing to low-consumption residential users from the price reductions in telecommunications.
Indeed, the reduction of prices in telecommunications has been two times greater to the top high spending customers than to the rest of customers because a much larger proportion of low and medium users' bills has been spent on those services (such as rental) which have not experienced a sharp reduction in prices 2 .
The Oftel's response to this evidence was to focus its price control in a way that reflected the pattern of usage of the low-medium spending residential customers. By To have an idea of the different control over prices that can be exerted by adopting the new price cap formula instead of the traditional Laspeyres price cap, we propose here a simple example which uses the data of average spending in telecommunications reported in w over the price change of one good, the fewer is the possibility that the regulated firm might transfer to others prices the burden of any reduction in p m . This is indeed the essence of the 1997 Oftel's price cap reform. Thus, we can assert that the adoption of a price cap like that expressed by (3) allows to pursue those distributive objectives which were announced by Oftel itself.
However, a complete welfare analysis of this price cap reform should consider how any consumer allocates his expenditure in telecommunication services. Indeed, if Oftel does not want that price cap put other consumer groups in a comparatively disadvantaged situation, she has to think about the relative importance that rental and calls have in the bills of these consumers. In other words, if Oftel concludes to give greater importance to the welfare of low-medium spending residential customers, she has to be aware of the possible welfare effect over other customers' types.
A possible way to investigate this welfare effect is to make ad hoc assumptions on the regulator's welfare function in order to take into special account those customer types that should be characterised by a particular social concern and then to analyse the effects on this function due to the price changes induced by price cap. In fact, we are going to deal with an inverse procedure. That is, we do not formulate any assumption about the regulator's social welfare function but we uncover it and its implicit welfare weights throughout the observed regulatory choices which are actually set by Oftel.
Uncovering welfare weights: The theoretical background
When (RPI-X)=1, the price cap constraint given in (1) When (4) is satisfied, the convergence to optimal (second-best) prices is ensured in the long-run for virtually any form of W(p, y) (Iozzi, Poritz and Valentini, 2002) and we can consider ∂W/∂y n as the regulator's welfare weight over the n-th consumer (or group of consumers). ∂W/∂y n is equivalent to the Feldstein's definition of marginal social utility of income (Feldstein, 1972) , and it can be split into two components. While ∂W/∂v n does actually catch the regulator's preference over customer n, ∂v n /∂y n is "exogenous" in some sense to the regulator as it depends on the individual utility function v n (p, y n ).
However, to interpret ∂W/∂y n as the regulator's welfare weight, or social preference, over individual n is a very standard method which is used in many papers dealing with the marginal welfare effects of price variations (for instance, Blundel and Preston, 1995; Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1995; Newbery, 1995; Banks, Blundel and Lewbel, 1996) .
Given this theoretical framework, the way we can embrace to uncover the regulator's welfare weights is straightforward. If we assume that for any good in the regulated bundle the Oftel's decision on t m w is consistent with her preferences over consumers, at any period t we can set the observed t m w (as those in (2) and (3)) equal to the optimal * ) ( t m w as defined in (4) and solve out for the welfare weights ∂W/∂y n , provided that: 1) the number of equations, M, is not less than the number of unknowns, N; and 2) we are able to observe the prices and the quantities consumed by each group of consumers at t-
1.

Distributional implications: A simple numerical example
Suppose a hypothetical empirical application where the researcher is interested in evaluating the regulator's welfare weights over particular categories of consumers such as low income consumers, unemployed, or consumers with some special need. For instance, in the case of the UK telecommunication market we could imagine to investigate the welfare effect of the new Oftel's price cap formula over two specific categories of BT's customers: low-medium spending customer and customers living in rural areas. As long as protecting consumers living in rural areas were another possible regulatory task, it would be necessary to evaluate whether the new Oftel's price cap formula conflict in some measure with other regulatory instruments intended to protect that category.
To substantiate the importance of this point, we look now at a very simple example. Let us suppose a price capped firm selling two goods to one-hundred customers. At time t-1 the total revenue of the firm is equal to 2,000 pounds since This hypothesised disaggregation allows us to observe that, although a significant part of the expenditure accruing from low-medium spending customers goes to good 1, customers living in rural areas show to use more good 2 than customers living in urban areas do. Thus, any regulatory policy aimed at a relatively stricter control upon the price of good 1 (and at a consequently weaker control upon p 2 ) would have a negative impact on the welfare of those consuming a larger amount of q 2 . Whether a regulator is aware of this implication, she is deliberately attaching a lower welfare weight to this group of customers.
To make this argument clearer we go now to show what are the regulator's welfare weights if different forms of price cap are implemented under the hypotheses reported in the present example.
In a two good case, the traditional price cap Laspeyres-type would be underlying (6) and (7) As we would expect, it comes out that, (6) is neutral with respect to any partition of the consumers' set. Indeed, from simple calculation we obtain that, under the regulatory regime given by (6),
On the contrary, by calculating the welfare weights which identify (7), we obtain that, according to the new regulatory aims, the social welfare weight over consumers A and A are equal to 1 and 0 respectively. However, we also have that implementing (7) involves Even if this is nothing more than a numerical example with absolutely no connection with real data, it shows a point that would probably deserve further attention in future empirical researches. Indeed, under the previous tariff basket price cap, Oftel assigned (∂W/∂y) n =1 to any consumer unit and, then, also to any consumer group obtained by any partition of N. This implied also that the traditional price cap were "neutral" with respect to other possible policies intended to affect specific groups of TLC users. On the other hand, we can claim that, by the price cap reform undertaken in 1997, Oftel is efficiently pursuing the distributional objectives that it announced in its official documents. However, we still need empirical evidence to state whether the new Oftel's formula conflicts with other possible social objectives. In principle we cannot rule out this eventuality. Oftel, 1997 
